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Due Process Requirements
In the name of constitutional due process requirements-as articu-
lated in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.1 and Fuentes v. Shevin 2-
lower courts have recently upset a wide range of legal practices. 3 Thus
far, the doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction has remained unscathed,
although by the logic of Sniadach and Fuentes it should be severely
limited. For quasi in rem jurisdiction requires precisely that which due
process prohibits, namely, a seizure of property' prior to giving the
defendant notice and the opportunity for a hearing.5
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. Practices declared unconstitutional on the basis of the Sniadach.Fuentes line of
cases include:
The suspension or termination of unemployment or workmen's compensation without
prior notice or hearing, Java v. Calif. Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875
(N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Crow v. Calif. Dep't of Human Resources,
325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.. 924 (1972); Wheeler v. State
of Vermont, 335 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1971, mod. 1972); Davis v. Caldwell, 53 F.R.D. 373
(N.D. Ga. 1971); summary attachment and body execution for non-compliance with a
continuing divorce decree for support and alimony payment, Randall v. Randall, 129 Vt.
432, 282 A.2d 794 (1971); Mills v. Howard, 280 A.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1971); summary
body execution for failure to comply with a debtor disclosure law, Desmond v. Hachey,
315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me. 1970); and possessory liens, McConaghley v. City of N.Y., 60
Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136 (CiV. CL City of N.Y. 1969) (hospital lien); Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (inn-keeper's lien); Collts v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338
F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (inn-keeper's lien); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (distress for rent); Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wash. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (Ct. App.
1972) (garageman's lien).
4. This Note confines itself to personal property. To obtain quasi in ren jurisdiction
over real property, a lis pendens is filed at the commencement of the suit. It is ques-
tionable whether this is a taking of "use and possession," Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US. 67,
81 (1972), sufficient to bring into play the due process requirements discussed at pp.
1024-25 infra.
The doctrine of lis pendens states that a person who deals with property while it is
in litigation does so at his peril, see, e.g., Mackenzie v. Engelhard Co., 266 US. 131,
142-44 (1924); Thompson v. Baker, 141 U.S. 648 (1891), thereby preventing effective dis-
position of the property. It has been argued that lis pendens and related de, ices con-
stitute sufficient restriction of property use to bring the due process requirement into
play. See Note, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 34 ALBANY L. Rv. 426, 444 (1970). The contrary position was
taken in Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971):
The defendant is neither deprived of the use or enjoyment of the property pending
a trial on the merits, nor is his livelihood threatened by the deprivation of the
right to freely transfer the realty.
Id. at 102. See Note, The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the
Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 986, 1000 (1970). The latter position is probably preferable, as
long as it takes into account the normal use of the propert)y to the defendant. The
requirements of Sniadach and Fuentes would only apply to a its pendens placed on real
property if the defendant were holding the land as a real estate agent or speculator,
since a lis pendens would severely limit the land's usefulness to the defendant as a
commodity for sale. See Note, The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas
of the Law, 68 MicH. L. REv. 986, 1000 n.66 (1970).
5. The need for such prior seizure was decreed in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714
(1877), see note 8 infra, and has generally been assumed ever since. Howevcr, the validity
of this assumption is open to criticism. ThZ problem of service of process has been
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I. The Present State of the Law
The present theoretical structure of quasi in rem jurisdiction origi-
nated with Pennoyer v. Neff0 in 1877. Since a state was deemed to
have exclusive jurisdiction over property within its territory, and since
property may be owned by non-residents, the question arose as to the
extent of the state's power in cases which are not, strictly speaking,
in rem. Justice Field concluded that, in such a situation, the local court
must limit its inquiry to the disposition of property over which it had
control.7 This presented the difficulty, however, that control would
be lost if the property were removed from the state once proceedings
had begun but before final judgment. To relieve this uncertainty,8
and also to fulfill due process notice requirements,0 the Court deter-
mined that an immediate seizure of the property was necessary as a
prerequisite to jurisdiction.
The practice of jurisdictional attachment must now be reconsidered
in light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'0 and Fuentes v. Shevin,1'
which respectively invalidated wage garnishment and replevin statutes
on the constitutional basis that the Due Process Clause requires notice
and the opportunity to the defendant for a hearing before there can
be any taking of his property.' 2 Fuentes, if not earlier cases,' 3 deter-
settled by the long-arm statutes. Since the state has power over property in its territory,
and since notice can be served without seizure of the property, it is conceivable that
jurisdiction quasi in rem no longer requires prior attachment. See Hazard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 268-69, 277.
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7. Id. at 728.
8. Immediate seizure of the property is required, because otherwise:
the validity of the proceedings and judgment [would] depend upon the question
whether, before the levy of the execution, the defendant had or had not disposed
of his property.
Id. at 728.
9. The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, in person
or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, not
only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any
proceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.
Id. at 727.
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
11. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
12. For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has
been dear: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must be notified." Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. 223 ...
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose ... it is clear
that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378-79 (1971).
13. The first cases seemed to involve a narrow definition of property. In Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1968), the Supreme Court invalidated Wisconsin's
garnishment statute which permitted the attachment of wages without affording prior
notice and hearing to the defendant. The opinion characterized wages as a "specialized
type of property," id. at 340, the taking of which "may as a practical matter drive a
1024
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mined the breadth of this rule's application by effectively defining
property in terms of any "possessory interest." 1' Since a seizure of per-
sonal property for the purposes of obtaining jurisdiction quasi in rem
entails a physical taking of property, it would appear to be subject to
the strictures of the Due Process Clause.
However, there is a recognized exception to the rule established by
Sniadach and Fuentes: notice and the opportunity for a hearing may
be postponed until after seizure in "extraordinary situations."' 5 The
question, then, is whether a taking of property for the purposes of
quasi in rem jurisdiction always constitutes such an exception to the
requirement of prior notice and hearing. Most courts facing this
issue16 have answered in the affirmative because of Sniadach's citation
to Ownbey v. Alorgan'7 as presenting an example of an extraordinary
situation.' s
But such a reliance on the Ownbey citation appears to involve a
wage-earning family to the wall." Id. at 34142. Only Justice Harlan, in a concurring
opinion, clearly emphasized the broad scope of the term "property." Id. at 342-43. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the
termination or suspension of welfare payments before giving the recipient notice and
the opportunity for a hearing. The Court again stressed the immediate and desperate
harm of such a termination. Beginning with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), how-
ever, the Court's language was broader. It declared Georgia's automobile financial re-
sponsibility statute unconstitutional on the ground that, absent a prior determination
of the reasonable possibility of judgment against an individual involved in an accident,
requiring him to post a bond or else have his driver's license suspended was the taking
of a property interest without due process of law. See also Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1971). in which the Court invalidated the pre-hearing attachment
of a bank account, noting that "rights in property are basic civil rights." Id. at 552. A
number of state and federal courts continued to read Sniadach and Goldberg as apply-
ing narrowly to "hardship" takings of property. See cases collected in Fuentes v. Shesin,
407 U.S. 67, 72-73 n.5 (1972). This reading was rejected by the Supreme Court in Fuentes,
which invalidated the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania because they in-
volved summary authorizations (by a court clerk and prothonotary, respectively) to
seize property without provision for prior notice and hearing for the defendants. The
Court, which adopted Justice Harlan's de minimis standard, zd. at 90 n2l, pointed out
that "the Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally." Id. at 90. Referring
to those cases evidencing a narrower interpretation, the Court said:
They reasoned that Sniadach and Goldberg, as a matter of constitutional principle,
established no more than that a prior hearing is required with respect to the
deprivation of such basically "necessary" items as wages and welfare benefits....
They did not.
Id. at 88.
14. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
15. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1908); Fuentes v. Shesin, 407
U.S. 67, 90 (1972). See pp. 1026-29 infra.
16. See both the district and appellate court opinions in Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing
and Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afJ'd, -156 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). Note particularly the concurring opinion of Judge
Gibbons, 456 F.2d at 982-83. The case is discussed at pp. 1038-39 infra. See also Tucker
v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970) (discussed at pp. 1033-34 infra); Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). But see 2Mills v. Bartlett,
265 A.2d 39 (Super. Ct. Del. 1970) (discussed at note 76 infra).
17. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
18. 395 U.S. at 339.
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misinterpretation of both Ownbey and Sniadach.19 The constitution-
ality of the jurisdictional attachment in Ownbey was never chal-
lenged; indeed, the plaintiff argued for its continuation. Hence, it
is unclear on what basis the courts can now use the citation of that
case in Sniadach to justify quasi in rem seizure in all situations. Still,
this is precisely what the Pennsylvania federal courts recently did in
Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp.20 And while the courts
acknowledged their position to be inconsistent with a broad inter-
pretation of the Sniadach doctrine,21 the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari.
22
The current confusion of the law cannot be resolved unless the
Court confronts the central issue. Since quasi in rem jurisdiction re-
quires a taking of property prior to notice and hearing, it must either
qualify the Sniadach-Fuentes rules or be qualified by them. This
Note argues that the latter view is correct. An examination of the
"extraordinary situations" formula and a more thorough examination
of Ownbey v. Morgan in its historical context indicate the necessity
of restricting quasi in rem jurisdiction to certain narrowly defined
classes of situations.
II. The "Extraordinary Situations" Exception
The Court has carefully limited the scope of the "extraordinary
situations" exception under which the notice and hearing required by
due process may be postponed until after seizure of property. Citing
19. See pp. 1029-32 infra.
20. 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972).
21. The district court defended jurisdictional attachment reluctantly, and apparently
expected the Supreme Court to review its decision. 326 F. Supp. at 1353, The court's
attitude, prevalent throughout its opinion, is reflected in these passages:
[B]ecause the case has been a difficult one for us and because it is on the frontier
of a rapidly developing field of law, we have set forth not only our reasons for
denying the motion, but also our views as to countervailing considerations which
we consider to be of substance, in considerable detail.
326 F. Supp. at 1337.
The broad sweep of the [non-resident seizure) rules encompasses within its grasp
virtually every type of claim, every type of property and every type of defendant
without procedural safeguard.
Id. at 1350.
We have expressed our grave doubts as to whether Sniadach can be narrowly read,
and as to whether the Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedure is sufficiently
narrowly drawn to pass procedural due process muster under the broader interpre-
tation of Sniadach.
Id. at 1352. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972), where the Court ap.
proves this court's evaluation of Sniadach as stating a broad rule of procedural due
process.
22. 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
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prior Supreme Court cases23 which had dealt with such situations, the
Fuentes opinion emphasized the existence of the following common
elements:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a need for very prompt action. Third,
the State has kept very strict control over its monopoly of legiti-
mate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a govern-
ment official responsible for determining, under the standards of
a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in
the particular instance.24
A closer examination of the types of creditor and governmental inter-
ests which are protected by the "extraordinary situations" exception
and permitted a hearing postponement emphasizes the limited nature
of that rule.
A. General Creditor Interest
Creditors may never qualify under the "extraordinary situations"
exception on the basis of their creditor status alone. This is because
the primary creditor interest, security, is not sufficient to place credi-
tors in an "unusual" situation. Although most of the creditors in
Fuentes had such an interest,2 the Court held that prior notice and
hearing were required.2 6 Nor does it help to allege that the defendant
has refused to pay his bill. Such a situation presents a commonplace,
not unusual,27 creditor-debtor relationship.28 Finally, the creditor may
not invoke the exception with a perfunctory allegation that the debtor
23. See cases cited in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1963), and
in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 nn.23-28 (1972). See pp. 1028-29 infra.
24. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
25. The exception was Mrs. Washington, one of the appellants from Penns)lania
who was in a custody struggle with her husband, a local sheriff, over their son. The
husband replevied the boy's toys, clothing and furniture. 407 US. at 72.
26. 407 US. 67, 92-93, 96 (1972). The Court pointed out that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protections extend to the debtor's "interest in the continued possession and use
of the goods," id. at 86, even though the creditor may be able to show that he has
retained legal title.
27. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (protecting a claimant's possible judgment
"is not . . . justification for denying the due process of its citizens." Id. at 540); Lucas
v. Stapp, 6 Wash. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1972) (refusal of a person to pay a
repair bill is in the nature of "a commonplace rather than an extraordinary situation."
497 P.2d at 252).
28. Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 397 (N.D. 111. 1972); Santiago V.
McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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will abscond;209 rather, he must prove to the court that this is suffi-
ciently likely to occur.30
The only situations which are so extraordinary as to permit a pre-
hearing attachment are those which involve a strong probability of
flight by the defendant, or of his fraudulent concealment, conveyance
or waste of the property.3 ' Since the state must retain tight control over
the legitimate seizure process, its rules must be narrowly drawn to allow
such use of force only in those situations where the creditor proves
this special need for protection.32
B. Governmental or General Public Interest
The explicit situations actually sanctioned by the Supreme Court
for postponing notice and hearing have all exhibited threats to impor-
tant government or public interests.3 3 With the possible exception of
Ownbey,34 cases cited by the Court in Sniadach and Fuentes all have
involved immediate, irreparable, grave and widespread harm. Protect-
29. See Cedar Rapids Eng. Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan Cty. 1971), ajf'd, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1972) (even the filing of an affidavit based
upon information and belief that the debtor would abscond lacks any probative force).
A major problem which runs throughout the considerations in these situations is the
deterioration of pleadings into a ritual incantation of magical words, and the filling in
of blanks on a standard form. See Kosches v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 797, 327 N.Y.S.2d
968, 970 (Civ. Ct. City of N.Y. 1971). ("Most affidavits are pro forma, based on hearsay
and speculation.')
30. See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971),
which observed that ample opportunity to abscond exists for the debtor, before the
creditor makes any application to the court since, under normal circumstances, the
creditor tries other collection devices first. Id. at 277-79, 486 P.2d at 1256-57, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 56-57. See also Cedar Rapids Eng. Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 210, 326 N.Y.S.2d
653, 657-58 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. 1971), aff'd, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1972); Kosches v. Nichols,
68 Misc. 2d 795, 797, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (Civ. Ct. City of N.Y. 1971).
The courts have felt that a hearing "will not substantially increase the risk that
[debtors] 'Shall fold their tents, like Arabs, and as silently steal away.'" Blair v. Pitchess,
supra, 5 Cal. 3d at 298, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal Rptr. at 56.
Innkeeper liens have been invalidated, despite the creditors' arguments that transients
are obviously more likely to leave the jurisdiction than the normal debtor. Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp.
390 (N.D. I1. 1972).
31. Nor do the broadly drawn Florida and Pennsylvania statutes limit the summary
seizure of goods to special situations demanding prompt action. There may be cases
in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will
destroy or conceal disputed goods.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972). See also Randone v. App. Dep't of Sup. Ct. of
Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556-57, 488 P.2d 13, 26-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722.23 (1971).
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
33. In the earlier case, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1968), the
Court spoke of "a state or creditor interest." Id. at 339 (emphasis added). All such cases
cited in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), however, were characterized as involving"a government or general public interest." Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added). This change
in language clarifies the broad nature of the interests necessary before a debtor will be
denied notice and a prior hearing:
The replevin of chattels, as in the present cases, may satisfy a debt or settle a score,
But state intervention in a private dispute hardly compares to state action furthering
a war effort or protecting the public health.
Id. at 92-93.
34. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), discussed at pp. 1029-32 infra.
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ing the public from a bank failure's economic consequences during the
depression,3 : from misbranded drugs 30 and from contaminated food a -
all met this criterion in the fact situations at issue, as did protecting the
government during a national war effort38 and in its attempts to col-
lect the internal revenue when the assets might otherwise have been
lost.39
On the other hand, protection of "fiscal and administrative re-
sources" has been held not sufficiently extraordinary, particularly if
the government may protect itself in ways other than through a pre-
hearing seizure.40 Similarly, measures which bear no rational relation-
ship to valid areas of governmental concern have been judged inade-
quate to justify a denial of due process.
4 '
In effect, therefore, the rules governing exceptions for government
interest are no less strict than those for the creditor. The only practical
difference, experience indicates, is that the government is more likely
than the individual creditor to meet the necessary requirements.
C. A Special Jurisdictional Exception
These strict criteria have been virtually ignored in recent foreign
attachment cases42 evidently adopting the view that all seizures of prop-
erty incident to the obtaining of quasi in rem jurisdiction fall within
the "extraordinary situations" exception. The error of this position,
based on Sniadach's ambiguous reference to Ownbey,43 may be seen
35. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
36. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberg, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
37. North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
38. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 553 (1921); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239,
245 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 556 (1921).
39. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
40. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Java v. Calif. Dep't of Human
Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1970). alJ'd, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Crow v.
Calif. Dep't of Human Resources, 325 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 924 (1972); Davis v. Caldwell, 53 F.R.D. 373 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Wheeler v. State of Ver-
mont, 335 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1971, mod. 1972). For example, the state can protect itself
from a loss of money by the enactment of penalty provisions, through recoupment meas-
ures from those ineligible persons accepting welfare, by accelerating the hearing process and
by hiring more personnel. See Crow v. Calif. Dep't of Human Resources, supra, at 1317.
41. In cases involving automobile financial responsibility statutes, e.g., Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971), the state typically advanced its interests in protecting the community
from threats to safety. This is obviously a matter within the state's concern. But the
Court, ruling the statutes unconstitutional, pointed out that the interests of the com-
munity are not served by suspending the licenses of those not likely to be held liable
for the accidents. And insofar as the statutes were designed to protect a claimant's pos-
sible judgment, this is in the nature of a creditor interest and "is not . . . justification
for denying the due process of its citizens." Id. at 540.
42. See note 16 supra.
43. "Such summary procedure [an in rem seizure of wages prior to notice and
hearing] may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations.
Cf. . . . Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-112; ....... Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1968).
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from the clearer reference to that case in Fuentes and by an examina-
tion of Ownbey's historical setting.
In a footnote, the Fuentes opinion referred to Ownbey as a "case
involv[ing] attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court."'
4
Since this footnote appears in the same paragraph with other cases in-
volving the governmental and public interests in immediate seizure
discussed above,45 and since the sentence containing this reference is
immediately transitional to the mentioning of the common elements
of extraordinary situations, 46 Ownbey was clearly intended to be under-
stood in the context of the limited due process exception which Fuen-
tes outlines. The Supreme Court must therefore have cited Ownbey
only for its factual situation which, at the time, was an example of an
extraordinary interest requiring special protection.
The Ownbey plaintiffs, executors of J. P. Morgan's estate, attached
non-resident Ownbey's shares in a Delaware corporation. State law re-
quired the posting of a special bail by a non-resident defendant as a
prerequisite to filing a general appearance.47 Since Ownbey could not
raise the bail, he argued that either the court should, by its equitable
powers, waive the bail requirement on due process grounds, or alter-
natively, that the attachment-which under existing law would dissolve
when a general appearance was filed 48-should be permitted to con-
tinue as a substitute for the bail. The court denied this motion, 40 and
the Delaware5" and United States5' Supreme Courts affirmed.
To appreciate the significance of these decisions it is necessary to
understand the law in Delaware in 1915, the year when the Ownbey
suit was instituted. Delaware had no personal jurisdiction over Own-
bey since he was a non-resident. Under Pennoyer v. Neff,52 Delaware
44. The statement reads in full: "Another case involved attachment necessary to
secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly a most basic and important public interest.
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972).
45. See pp. 1027-29 supra.
46. 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972).
47. DEL. REv. CODE 4123, § 6 (1915), reprinted in Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. at
102 n.1.
48. This requirement was widely acknowledged at the time. See, e.g., Patton, Foreign
Attachment in Pennsylvania (An Outline), 56 U. PA. L. REv. 137 (1908). It orilinated
from the procedure in the Mayor's Court of London on which American quasi in rein
statutes relied. See, e.g., London Joint Stock Bank v. Mayor of London, 5 C.P.D. 491,
499 (C.A. 1880). The inequitable result in Ownbey arose by later providing for special
bail, a move designed to make attachment for jurisdiction also effectively act as se-
curity. Ownbey v. Morgan, 29 Del. 379, 100 A. 411, 421 (Super. Ct. 1916), aff'd, 30 Del.
297 (1917), ajf'd, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
49. 29 Del. 379, 100 A. 411 (Super. Ct. 1916).
50. 30 Del. 297 (1917). Ironically, by the time Ownbey's appeal had reached the
Delaware Supreme Court "by recent legislation defendants in foreign attachment cases
[were] permitted to appear without first giving bail." Id. at 323.
51. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
52. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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(whatever its interests in the suit might be) could only obtain jurisdic-
tion by attaching the defendant's local property, thereby satisfying due
process notice requirements, and creating an action quasi in rem.53
This was accomplished when J. P. Morgan's executors attached Own-
bey's shares in the Delaware corporation.
Neither in the state court nor in the United States Supreme Court
did Ownbey contest this jurisdiction or the attachment of his property.
Rather, his arguments centered on the right to file a general appear-
ance, even if that meant a continuation of the attachmenta"
Since 1915, Ownbey and Pennoyer have been overtaken by impor-
tant changes in the law.5 Seizure alone, for example, may no longer
be sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.aa And Boddie v. Con-
necticut57 casts doubt upon the legality of limiting access to the civil
courts, the principal issue in the Ownbey case.as Most importantly, a
court now may obtain in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, as long as he has certain "minimum contacts" with the
forum state.5 9 This is a fundamental modification of the Pennoyer
rule, and means that it is no longer necessary to attach a non-resident's
property to obtain jurisdiction in all cases.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court in 1972 said that Ownbey v.
Morgan "involved attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state
court," G0 it could only have meant that such attachment was "neces-
sary" under the law in 1915, and not that it is always necessary today
53. See p. 1024 supra, for a discussion of the Pennoyer conceptual framework for
jurisdiction. See also Hazard, supra note 5, at 245.72.
54. See p. 1030 supra.
55. See generally Hazard, supra note 5.
56. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 305 (1950) (sufficient
notice to beneficiaries lacking where a trust was in court for settlement and notice was.
under statute, by publication). "[W]ithin the limits of practicability notice must be
such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties." Id. at 318.
57. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
58. [A] State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard
if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause. . . . .T]he right to a
meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of practicality, must be pro-
tected against denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular
individuals.
Id. at 379-80.
59. Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personain is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence
was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Penno)er
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733. . . .But now that the capias ad respondendunm has given
way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if lie be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." Milliken, v. Meyer, 311 US. 457, 463 ....
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). For an example
of the wording of a "minimum contacts" statute, see note 71 infra.
60. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
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or that, even when necessary, jurisdictional considerations always jus-
tify postponement of the due process requirements.
III. Specific Limitations on Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
It is the contention of this Note that the seizure of property for jur-
isdictional purposes0 ' is only justified in very limited circumstances
which conform to the "extraordinary situations" criteria listed in Fuen-
tes.02 Seizure is not justified where the quasi in rem device is not neces-
sary to secure jurisdiction in state court, nor where jurisdiction cannot
be defended as "an important governmental or general public inter-
est."63 And where seizure does result in jurisdiction, a hearing-which
Fuentes only postpones, not eliminates-must be held promptly on the
merits should the defendant so desire.
A. Quasi in Rem as an Unnecessary Basis of Jurisdiction
Foreign attachment serves two distinct purposes for the creditor:
it establishes jurisdiction in a desired forum, and it renders the prop-
erty attached available as security for the claimed debt. 4 The former
purpose is served equally well, without seizure, when in personam
jurisdiction is available through the minimum contacts approach and
service of process by the use of a long arm statute.0 5 Fuentes, it must
be remembered, cited Ownbey as a case in which attachment had been
necessary to obtain jurisdiction; attachment is not justified where jur-
isdiction could be established in personam.
The creditor's only remaining interest, therefore, is in obtaining
security without affording the defendant prior notice and a hearing.
But this is no different from his interest in a suit against a resident
defendant, which both Sniadach and Fuentes ruled is not valid grounds
61. See p. 1024 supra.
62. 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
63. Id. at 91.
64. See Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1339-40 (E.D.
Pa. 1971). See note 48 supra.
65. It can be argued that in personam jurisdiction is actually more advantageous to
the plaintiff, since the defendant is then liable for the entire claim. On the other hand,
one court has suggested that quasi in rem jurisdiction avoids the possibility of a pro-
tracted litigation over the availability of long-arm process, pointing out that the ultimate
determination might be that jurisdiction does not exist. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing &
Finance Corp., 456 F.2d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1972). But Fuentes does not justify such a
rationale:
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and it Is
often more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these
rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right.
407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972). If the result of the litigation is a loss of jurisdiction, it Is
difficult to see the importance of the state's interests in the suit. See pp. 1034.35 infra.
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for an exception to the due process requirements.00 The creditor, in
certain instances, may be able to argue successfully to the court in an
ex parte application that the non-residency of the debtor makes it
likely that the defendant will dispose of his property before a hearing
can be held.G7 But a showing of non-residency alone will not sustain
the creditor's burden of proving an unusual need for a preliminary
seizure. 68 Furthermore, the creditor may make his allegations equally
well in an in personam suit, and, if he succeeds, may attach property
without prior notice and hearing.
The distinction, therefore, between proceeding in personam and
quasi in rem is that the former insures that the court's attention will
focus on the defendant's due process rights. The creditor forced to
accept in personam jurisdiction is at no disadvantage not envisioned
by the Sniadach-Fuentes decisions. He has the forum of his choice,
and he may attach the defendant's property after notice and a hearing,
or earlier if summary seizure is "justified in the particular instance."1' 0
Tucker v. Burton7 0 illustrates the abuses of the present practice.
Mrs. Tucker, a Maryland resident employed in Washington, D.C.,
was guarantor on a contract signed in Washington with a local corpo-
ration. Upon alleged default, the company assigned its rights to House-
hold Finance Corporation. HFC obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction in
Washington by garnishing Mrs. Tucker's wages. The attachment was
upheld by the District Court on the ground that she was a non-resi-
dent. However, as Judge Wright pointed out in a forceful dissent,
HFC could easily have proceeded in personam in Washington. Since
the contract was signed there and with a local corporation, sufficient
66. See pp. 1027-28 supra.
67. See note 31 supra; Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp.. 326 F. Supp.
1335, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Even in cases where the creditor is not able to sustain the
burden of proof required to obtain an authorized seizure of the debtor's property, he
may still obtain protection against the dissipation of the property which is the subject
of the dispute. There is no reason why the courts could not issue a temporary restraining
order as a is pendens-type substitute for immediate seizure of personalty. See Finkcnberg
Furniture v. Vasquez, 67 Misc. 2d 154, 162, 324 N.Y.S.2d 840, 850 (Civ. CE. City of N.Y.
1971), which ordered notice and hearing to the defendants before permitting seizure of
household goods, but which in the interim "enjoined and restrained [defendants] from
removing . . . . transfering, selling, assigning or otherwise disposing of said property,
and from permitting it to be subjected to any security interest or lien." See note 4
supra for a discussion of the probable validity of the lis pendens deice.
68. See Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1349.52 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D.D.C. 1970) (%%'right, J.. dissenting).
In an admiralty case, it has been held that plaintiff may not attach bank accounts under
a jurisdictional justification where defendant is subject to in personam jurisdiction
through his minimum contacts with the forum state. D/S A/S Flint v. Sabre Shipping
Corp., 228 F. Supp. 284, 285-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
69. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
70. 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970).
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minimum contacts existed,71 and service of process was possible either
by use of the long-arm statute 2 or by personally serving Mrs. Tucker
at her place of employment. If this had been done, however, jurisdic-
tion would not have been available as an excuse for the garnishment,",
and HFC would have had to proceed within the due process guidelines
dictated by Sniadach.
The result of the ruling in this case was to permit a creditor to dic-
tate the uses of state power. It is an anomoly that, by asserting an un-
necessary ground for jurisdiction, plaintiff is able to violate the rule
that the state must keep "very strict control over its monopoly of legi-
timate force. ' 74 In cases of this sort, the "non-resident" category serves
no other purpose than to improv the creditor's position at the ex-
pense of the debtor's constitutional rights. 0
B. Quasi in Rem as the Sole Basis of Jurisdiction
Cases exist where the quasi in rem device is necessary for state court
jurisdiction, but where it fails to serve an important governmental,
creditor or general public interest. In such situations, seizure without
prior notice and hearing is unjustified" and, it is submitted, the Fuen-
tes decision should require the state court to dismiss the suit for want
of jurisdiction.7
Our court system is predicated on the theory that a state does not
71. D.C. CODE § 13-423 (Supp. 1971) states in relevant part:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly, or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's--
(I) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; ...
72. See id., § 13-424:
When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this subchapter, service
may be made outside the District of Columbia.
73. The sole reason why this action was brought in a District of Columbia Court
-as counsel for Household Finance were frank to admit in oral argument-was to
take advantage of the District's prejudgment garnishment provisions ....
Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 577 (D.D.C. 1970) (Wright, J., dissenting).
74. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
75. See Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1349 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D.D.C. 1970) (Wright, J., dissenttnil ) .
In order to abscond, Mrs. Tucker would have had to leave her D.C. job, and tie
likelihood of this was never advanced by Household Finance.
76. Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Super. Ct. Del. 1970), supports this interpretation.
The Delaware Superior Court in that case sustained a jurisdictional objection by a
non-resident defendant. Plaintiff had obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction in Delaware by
attaching defendant's wages through his Delaware corporate employer. Since defendant
actually worked and lived in Massachusetts, and also since the cause of action arose
there, in personam jurisdiction over him was not available in Delaware. The court held
on appeal of the default judgment that in cases involving an in rem seizure, the due
process requirements of Sniadach must apply, regardless of whether the attachment is
foreign or domestic.
77. It is again assumed that quasi in rem jurisdiction requires a prior seizure of
property. But see note 5 supra.
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have an interest per se in asserting its jurisdiction over all cases.-8 The
legitimacy of jurisdiction stems from the ends it might serve, by, for
example, providing citizens of the state with a forum or preserving
the integrity of its state's laws."9 The doctrine of minimum contacts
is liberal in allowing in personam jurisdiction under such circum-
stances.s ° If these justifications are lacking, the court loses no impor-
tant interest in denying jurisdiction.
Likewise, the creditor has no legitimate interest in being able to
bring suit in any court of his choice.8' If in personam jurisdiction is
not available through the assertion of minimum contacts, the plain-
tiff's only remaining possible interests are, first, the necessity caused
by an "extraordinary situation," s2 and second, the desire to secure an
immediate attachment of the debtor's property. The former is a jus-
tifiable basis for jurisdiction since immediate seizure is the only ade-
quate remedy available to the creditor.8 3 In the latter cases, however,
necessity does not accompany plaintiff's desire for attachment.84 He
is in no different position from his counterpart in Fuentes, and should
not be permitted to circumvent due process requirements merely by
"forum shopping."
Thus, where in personam jurisdiction is not available, the state must
make a preliminary evaluation of the creditor's interests to insure that
prior seizure is "necessary and justified in the particular instance." 11
For example, a showing that, through no lack of diligence on the part
of the plaintiff, in personam jurisdiction over the defendant is also
lacking in every other forum may constitute sufficient justification; a
showing that other forums are merely inconvenient will not. Present
jurisdictional doctrine is consistent with this position. When two or
more legal forums are available for settling a dispute, plaintiff gener-
7M. Without good cause, a court may not take jurisdiction of a case under our fed-
eral system of government. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714, 720 (1877); D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
79. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a dihersity case in a forum
that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having
a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law
foreign to itself.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
80. See note 59 supra for a discussion of the "minimum contacts" theory, and D.C.
CODE, § 13-423 (Supp. 1971) for the wording of a typical statute.
81. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 US. 501, 506 (1947).
82. For example, if the debtor has fraudulently concealed his assets in the forum
state. See p. 1028 supra.
83. See, e.g., Finkenberg Furniture v. Vasquez, 67 'Misc. 2d 154, 324 N.YS.2d 840
(Civ. Ct. City of N.Y., 1971) (such a showing would suffice, but the court found the
proof in the case before it insufficient).
84. See p. 1027 supra.
85. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US. 67, 91 (1972).
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ally has the right to make the choice, but this is not absolute.80 A
court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction 7 on the ground of forum
non conveniens where, in the balance, the interests of the defendant
strongly urge it to do so. 8 Protection of the defendant's due process
rights is such a sufficiently strong reason if the plaintiff's own interests
are not "extraordinary."'80
C. The Post-Seizure Hearing
Assuming that an alternate form of jurisdiction is not available, and
assuming also that the creditor by an ex parte application has been
able to justify seizure in order to establish jurisdiction quasi in rem,
due process still demands notice and a hearing once the defendant's
property has been taken. 90 As soon as is reasonably possible, the de-
fendant must be given the opportunity for a hearing wherein lie may
move to quash the attachment on the basis of any defenses or counter-
claims he might have regarding the underlying cause of action.0 ' Since
no recent Supreme Court decision has dealt in detail with such a situa-
tion, it is less clear whether, as a matter of due process, the defendant
has a right to challenge the basis of the seizure itself, although one
might expect this to be so.0 2
86. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-09 (1947).
87. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932).
88. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947), and cases cited therein.
It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient fornm,
"vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.
Id. at 508.
89. Initial appearances to the contrary, First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona
Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971) is consistent with this position. In that
case, where a non-resident plaintiff attached the reserve assets in Arizona of a non-
resident defendant in a suit on a foreign cause of action the court upheld jurisdiction
quasi in rem, reversing the lower court. It apparently refused to apply forum non
conveniens, 107 Ariz. at 290, 486 P.2d at 188, because of its earlier decision limiting the
Sniadach doctrine to wages. Termplan, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa Co., 105 Ariz. 270,
463 P.2d 68 (1969) (this case is noted in Fuentes as reading the applicability of Sniadach
too narrowly. 407 U.S. at 73, n.5). Since it is now settled that such an interpretation Is
erroneous, see note 13 supra, the court should have affirmed the decision. See 107 Arliz.
at 290, 486 P.2d at 188.
90. Fuentes is careful to state that even "extraordinary situations" only justify "post-
poning" a hearing. 407 U.S. at 90.
91. [D]ue process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice" and "hearing" which
are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the
underlying claim against the alleged debtor ....
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972), quoting Sniadach at 343. See Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). This is not to say,
however, that the debtor may raise defenses which would not be available to him In a
trial on the merits. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Hutcherson v. Lehtin,
313 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 522 (1970) (where a
landlord's breach of a covenant to repair is extraneous to eviction or recovery of rent
due, that breach may not be raised by defendant in the hearing).
92. 'Whether based on constitutional grounds or not, it is customary to permit the
defendant to make a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT
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Under present practice, when a defendant is faced with an action
quasi in rem, most states give him the choice of defaulting in rem
(thereby losing the seized property but avoiding any further estoppel
effect) or appearing generally in personam (thereby being able to make
his defense, but only at the risk of losing on the entire underlying
claim rather than just the seized property).
On the other hand, some courts and commentators, either on princi-
ples of fairness94 or fundamental due process,93 have concluded that a
court which does not have a right to in personam jurisdiction may
not blackmail the defendant by requiring an in rem default if he does
not submit to the general jurisdiction; they argue the defendant has
a right to his day in court to defend his property without being forced
to forego his right to be free from the personal jurisdiction of a foreign
forum.
The Sniadach and Fuentes decisions tend to support this right of the
defendant to appear specially in the hearing on constitutional grounds.
It is important to note that the hearing required by the Court in
those two cases is a consequence of the seizure, and is therefore limited
to determining whether the seizure shall continue. Although the de-
fendant may raise defenses going to the merits of the cause of action, 0
the outcome is not a judgment on those merits.- It is a ruling only
(SEcoND) OF CoNruFcr OF LmWs § 81 (1971). Since challenging the ex parte application
upon which the right of seizure was granted is the same as a challenge of jurisdiction
in quasi in rem cases, it would appear to come under this rule. In fact, under the
common law it is customary to use the motion to quash as a Challenge to jurisdiction.
See D. LOUISELL 8& G. HAzLRD, CASEs AND MIATERLsLs ON PLE.AmG AND PROCEDtURE 431
(2d ed. 1968). This is also the procedure followed in federal courts. See, e.g., Grace v.
McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
93. See, e.g., N.Y. TEMP. Co..t'N, FOURTH PREUStNARY Rrror A-314 (1960). dis-
cussed in D. LouisELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 92, at 438.
94. See, e.g., Cheshire Nat'l Bank %'. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916). which
noted "the injustice of requiring a non-resident to surrender himself wholly to the
jurisdiction of the courts of a foreign state, in order to defend his property there
attached ...." Id. at 18, 112 N.E. at 502. While the court did not decide the case on
constitutional grounds, the influence of the Due Process Clause was clearly present in
its opinion. Id. at 17-18, 112 N.E. at 501-02.
95. See, e.g., Developments in the Law--State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv. L. Rss.
909, 953-55 (1954).
96. The Fuentes decision states that "it is axiomatic that the hearing must proiide
a real test." 407 U.S. at 97.
97. An analogy may be drawn between the motion to quash an attachment and
a motion for a temporary injunction, since in both cases a question of the merits of
the case may arise. In the temporary injunction, see, e.g., Dalmo Sales Co. v. T)ysons
Corner Reg. Shop. Ctr., 308 F. Supp. 988 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Iowa City v. Muscatine Dev. Co., 258 Iowa 1024, 141 N.W.2d 565 (1966):
The general rule is that the denial of a temporary injunction, or its dissolution if
granted, does not deprive plaintiff of the right to a trial on the merits of his
petition seeking a permanent injunction, nor is it an adjudication against such
right. Even though temporary relief is properly denied, a permanent injunction
may be granted where trial on the merits justifies such a decree.
Id. at 1033, 141 N.W.2d at 591.
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on an in rem motion. Therefore a state may not condition the de-
fendant's right to such a hearing on his submission to the general
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that it is being asked to render
a judgment wholly or partly in personam.
If the defendant chooses to file a general appearance, the suit be-
comes one in personam. The debtor is in the court to defend against
the underlying claim, and he is liable to a judgment for the underlying
debt. Continued attachment is thereafter superfluous to the question
of jurisdiction." As Fuentes makes clear, the defendant has the right
to a hearing on the attachment, at which time he may challenge the
plaintiff on the merits. Under these circumstances, the attachment
should be dissolved unless the creditor can provide the court with a
justification for its continuance that survives the securing of in per-
sonam jurisdiction.100
This rule should have been applied by the Pennsylvania federal
courts in Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp.01 There, a
Pennsylvania resident (Lebowitz) sued a Delaware corporation (Forbes)
not registered to do business in Pennsylvania. The action commenced
with a writ of foreign attachment served on two banks in Philadelphia,
where Forbes kept some checking accounts. The case was removed to
the federal district court, and Forbes entered a general appearance, at
the same time moving to quash the attachment. The motion was de-
nied 02 without a hearing on the merits of the case, and this decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
03
There was no compelling reason for the attachment to continue.
Once the general appearance was filed, Forbes stood to Lebowitz in
the same relationship as a good-faith resident defendant to a local plain-
tiff creditor. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals con-
sidered a continuing attachment justified.'0 4 Nevertheless, both courts
felt compelled to deny the motion to quash solely on the basis of the
98. Cf. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).
99. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 456 F.2d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1972); id.
at 982-85 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
100. It is true that execution on the judgment will not run outside the state, and
it is possible that the defendant will have insufficient property in the forum state to
satisfy adverse judgment. But his situation will then be no worse than if his debtor had
been a resident: He may bring suit on the judgment in a state where there is property,
or, where possible, he may register his judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, 9 U.L.A. 376 (1951).
101. 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afJ'd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1972).
102. 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
103. 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972).
104. 326 F. Supp. at 1352-53; 456 F.2d at 982. Note particularly 456 F.2d at 982-83
(Gibbons, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court's references in Sniadach to Ownbey v. Alorgan.103
The error of relying on Ownbey to justify unnecessary jurisdictional
attachment has already been demonstrated. 0 The Lebowitz decisions,
however, contain a second and more serious error: not even the most
"extraordinary situation" will eliminate the due process requirement
of notice and hearing after seizure. Sniadach and Fuentes only author-
ize an occasional postponement of the hearing on the merits. Once the
attachment is secured and jurisdiction thereby attained, the reasons
for postponing the hearing disappear.
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court decisions since 1968 in the due process area,
whether they have built a new construct or are simply faithful to old
principles,107 require a re-evaluation of any state-sanctioned practice
which results in a seizure of property without prior notice and a hear-
ing. Subjecting jurisdictional attachment to such scrutiny reveals that
the quasi in rem device, as presently employed in many cases, violates
fundamental requirements of due process.
105. 256 U.S. 94 (1921). The Pennsylvania decisions also relied on the Sniadach
Court's citation to McKay v. Mclnnis, 279 U.S. 820 (1928). The Mcnnis case involved
the attachment of a resident's property. See McInnis v. McKay, 127 Me. 110. 111 (1928).
The state court's decision to uphold the attachment was affirmed per curiam by the
Supreme Court with this single sentence: "Affirmed on the authority of Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 109; Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31." 279 U.S. at 820.
The reference to this case in Sniadach is ambiguous at best:
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, see McKay
v. Mclnnis, 279 U.S. 820, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every
case. The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does
not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modem forms. We
deal here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system.
395 U.S. at 340. The Court said in Fuentes that "[a]s far as essential procedural due
process doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand for any more than was established in the
Coffin Brothers and Ownbey cases on which it relied completely." 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23
(1972). Concerning Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), see pp. 1028-29 supra.
106. See pp. 1029-32 supra. Both the district court and the court of appeals in
Lebowitz conceded that Forbes was subject to in personam jurisdiction through its
..minimum contacts" with Pennsylvania, and hence the attachment was not necessary
to secure jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the attachment was said to be legitimate (under
Ownbey) on jurisdictional grounds. 326 F. Supp. at 1348-49; 456 F.2d at 981-82. See
pp. 1032-33 supra.
107. The Supreme Court itself disclaimed the notion that its cases "marked a radical
departure from established principles of procedural due process." Fuentes v. She~in, 407
U.S. 67, 88 (1972). See Randone v. App. Dep't of S. Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971):
To be sure, the result reached in Sniadach constituted a departure from earlier
decisions which had upheld summary prejudgment attachment and garnishment;
the change, however, resulted not from an alteration of principles of due process
but instead from a reevaluation of the potential and actual effect of prejudgment
seizure upon debtors.
Id. at 551, 488 P.2d at 22-23, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
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